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INTERPRETING THE "REASONABLE NUMBER OF REPAIR ATTEMPTS"
STANDARD IN LEMON LAw ARBITRATIONS
Mark Hanin, Carter Greenbaum, Jeremy Aron-Dine*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2014, 2015, and 2016, consumers filed class-action lawsuits
against Ford Motor Company alleging "inherent defects" in the design
of Ford's PowerShift transmission in the Focus and Fiesta models.'
These defects reportedly cause the transmission to stall, slip, jerk, stut-
ter, accelerate without warning, and stop too slowly. These transmis-
sion problems do not manifest until after the car has been driven many
thousands of miles,2 by which point the statutory period during which
the consumer can institute a Lemon Law arbitration may have expired.
For example, in two cases that we have arbitrated, defects did not man-
ifest for the first time until after 10,000 and 15,000 miles, respectively.
In other cases that have come before the Connecticut Department of
Consumer Protection ("DCP"), the office responsible for administer-
ing Connecticut's Lemon Law program, consumers have repaired their
vehicles fewer than four times during the Lemon Law's "applicable
period." This factual situation makes it difficult to recover under Con-
necticut's Lemon Law, which was the first such statute enacted and set
the standard for subsequent Lemon Laws in all forty-nine other states
and the District of Columbia.
. Mark Hanin, J.D. Candidate Class of 2017, Yale Law School, Carter
Greenbaum, J.D., Yale Law School, and Jeremy Aron-Dine, J.D. Candidate Class of
2018, Yale Law School, were Directors of the Yale Law School Hearing Officer
Project in 2015, 2016, and 2017, respectively. Through the Project, students arbitrate
Lemon Law cases under the auspices of the Connecticut Department of Consumer
Protection's Lemon Law Program. Many thanks to Ian Ayres for helpful critiques
and to Timothy Clark and Richard Maloney from the Connecticut Department of
Consumer Protection for their thoughtful advice.
1See, e.g., Vargas v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2:12-cv-08388 (C.D. Cal. 2014);
Klipfel v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2:15-cv-02140 (C.D. Cal. 2015); Anderson v. Ford
Motor Co., No. 1:16-cv-01632 (N.D. 111. 2016); see also Clark v. Ford Motor Co.,
No. 2:15-cv-00287 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (alleging similar defects in the Ford Fl50).
2 See, e.g., Complaint at 11-13, Cusick v. Ford Motor Co., No. 2:15-cv-
08831 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2015) (alleging that Cusick did not bring her vehicle in
for repairs until three years after the purchase date).
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Ford's PowerShift transmission scandal is only the latest in a
series of problems that continue to test the ability of state Lemon Laws
to provide consumers adequate recourse against manufacturers for al-
leged defects. In light of these challenges, DCP asked us, as arbitrators,
to provide our interpretation of Connecticut's Lemon Law as it relates
to consumers who do not repair their vehicles at least four times during
the first two years or 24,000 miles of car ownership (the "Applicable
Period"). 3 As a threshold question, we must determine whether a con-
sumer may ever recover under the Lemon Law with fewer than four
repair attempts during the Applicable Period. We argue that, contrary
to the assertions of many automobile manufacturers, Connecticut's
Lemon Law permits cases to proceed to arbitration with fewer than
four repair attempts. More controversially, we argue that, when a de-
fect has been repaired at least once during the Applicable Period, re-
pairs made after that period for the same defect can constitute evidence
for recovery under the Lemon Law.
Our interpretation of Connecticut's Lemon Law affects dozens
of other state Lemon Laws. Connecticut was the first state to pass a
"Lemon Law" in 1982. Since then, all forty-nine other states and the
District of Columbia have followed suit. These other states have often
adopted lemon laws that mirror Connecticut's with only minor
changes. For example, California and New York's Lemon Laws pro-
vide recovery for consumers who have repaired their vehicle at least
four times in the first eighteen months (two years in New York) or
18,000 miles,4 while Connecticut requires two years or 24,000 miles.
Ohio's Lemon Law is virtually identical to Connecticut's, except that
its presumption provides relief for consumers who repair their vehicle
at least four times in the first year or 18,000 miles, and it provides
automatic relief for consumers who repair their vehicle at least eight
times.6
In advancing our reading of Connecticut's Lemon Law, we
have in mind three audiences. First, we hope to influence state agencies
charged with interpreting and carrying out their respective state Lemon
Laws. In particular, we urge state agencies like the Connecticut De-
partment of Consumer Protection to consider revising their eligibility
review of certain cases. Second, our discussion is aimed at arbitrators
and judges across the United States who decide Lemon Law cases in
the first instance. Third, our statutory analysis is aimed at courts re-
viewing arbitration awards in various jurisdictions. Our general view
3 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-179(b).
4 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.22(b); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a(b)(1).
'OHIO REV. CODE § 1345.72(a).
6 Id. § 1345.73(A)(3).
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is that DCP, some arbitrators, and a handful of courts have interpreted
Lemon Law statutes too narrowly and thus precluded some eligible
consumers from proceeding to arbitration and recovering under Con-
necticut's Lemon Law.
Part II analyzes the "reasonable number of repair attempts"
standard and argues that a single repair attempt can suffice for pro-
ceeding to arbitration. Part III turns from the number of repair attempts
to their timing. It argues that repair attempts made after the Applicable
Period can sometimes provide a basis for relief under Connecticut's
Lemon Law. Part IV addresses three objections to our reading of the
statute.
II. REASONABLE NUMBER OF REPAIR ATTEMPTS
Consumers who file claims for arbitration under Connecticut's
Lemon Law are not automatically entitled to make their case before an
arbitrator. Instead, DCP screens requests for arbitration. The Lemon
Law provides: "The department shall determine whether the complaint
should be accepted or rejected for arbitration based on whether it al-
leges that the manufacturer has failed to comply with section 42-179."'
Consumers may appeal DCP's finding that their claim is ineligible for
arbitration to an arbitrator. 9 However, arbitrators tend to follow DCP's
guidance and we could find no evidence of an arbitrator granting a
claim for relief after DCP had initially denied eligibility. Given the
statutorily-imposed screening process, it matters greatly what stand-
ards DCP uses to decide which claims can proceed to arbitration and
which claims are turned away ab initio. DCP's interpretation of the
Lemon Law thus takes center stage, serving a gatekeeping function for
consumers who seek relief under the Lemon Law. In this Part, we ar-
gue that consumers who have repaired their vehicle fewer than four (or
two) times are nevertheless eligible for arbitration.
7 AUTOMOBILE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROGRAM, CT. DEP'T OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION, ARBITRATOR HANDBOOK 5 (2016) [hereinafter ARBITRATOR
HANDBOOK] ("The eligibility determination is made by DCP staff in the first in-
stance.").
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-181(b) (2012).
Id. § 42-179(f) ("Any consumer injured by the operation of any procedure
which does not conform with procedures established by a manufacturer pursuant to
subsection (b) of section 42-182 and the provisions of Title 16 Code of Federal Reg-
ulations Part 703, as in effect on October 1, 1982, may appeal any decision rendered
as the result of such a procedure by requesting arbitration de novo of the dispute by
an arbitrator."); see also ARBITRATOR HANDBOOK, supra note 7 ("When a case is
determined to be ineligible for arbitration, the consumer is notified of the reasons for
ineligibility and may appeal DCP's ruling to an arbitrator.").
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A. The "Mechanics" of the Connecticut Lemon Law
Connecticut was the first state to pass a lemon law in 1982.10
By 1997, all forty-nine other states and the District of Columbia had
followed Connecticut's lead.I' The basic goal of Connecticut's Lemon
Law is to "compel performance of any express warranties made by the
manufacturer to the consumer."'2 It is a remedial statute, and courts
overwhelmingly interpret the Act broadly to effectuate this legislative
purpose. 3
The Connecticut Legislature enacted the Lemon Law to sup-
plement remedies available to consumers under the federal Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act and the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC").14
Prior to the enactment of the Lemon Law, it was difficult for consum-
ers to obtain sufficient remedies for a variety of reasons. Chief among
them was the universal practice of limiting vehicle warranties to "re-
pair or replacement of defective parts."15 Under the UCC, consumers
could only recover monetary damages when a limited remedy had
"failed of its essential purpose."16 This standard proved too onerous
for many consumers, and in response, the legislature enacted its own
"reasonable repair attempts" test to help consumers obtain relief; this
standard is codified as the Lemon Law in Connecticut General Statutes
10 See Act Concerning Automobile Warranties, Pub. Act No. 82-287,
1982 Conn. Acts 667 (Reg. Sess.) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-
179 (2012)). A second lemon law, Lemon Law II, was enacted in 1984 establishing
an independent arbitration procedure to settle disputes between consumers and man-
ufacturers. Act Concerning New Motor Vehicle Warranties and Dispute Resolution
Procedures for Defective Vehicles, Pub. Act No. 84-338, 1984 Conn. Acts 484 (Reg.
Sess.) (codified as amended at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-181 (2012)).
" See Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Automobile Lemon Laws: An Annotated Bibliog-
raphy, 8 LoY. CONSUMER L. REP. 39,39 (1996).
12 Marie Beattie, Note, The Connecticut Lemon Law, 5 U. BRIDGEPORT L.
REV. 175, 191 (1984) (citing statements by Representative Woodcock).
1 See ARBITRATOR HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 5-6 ("[T]he Lemon Law is
a 'remedial' statute which means it is to be liberally or broadly interpreted in favor
of the consumer."); see also Cagiva N. Am., Inc. v. Schenk, 680 A.2d 964, 968
(Conn. 1996) ("The Lemon Law is a remedial statute that protects purchasers of new
passenger motor vehicles."); Dieter v. Chrysler Corp., 610 N.W.2d 832, 837 (Wis.
2000) (quoting Hughes v. ChryslerMotors Corp., 542 N.W.2d 148, 151 (Wis. 1996))
("Remedial statutes like the lemon law are to be construed 'with a view towards the
social problem which the legislature was addressing when enacting the law."').
14 See Beattie, supra note 12, at 189.
1 But see id at 186 (discussing an exceptional case in which a consumer
recovered in spite of such a limitation).
16 U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2012).
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Chapter 743b, primarily in Section 42-179 (b), (d), and (e). 17
Before a case is eligible for arbitration, DCP conducts an eligi-
bility review of the complaint. DCP's policy is as follows: In cases
with fewer than four attempts, a consumer must affirmatively allege in
her request for arbitration that a reasonable number of repair attempts
has been done.' 8 The result is that some cases eligible for arbitration
based on the statute might not get past the gate. Until recently, for ex-
ample, cases in which many repair attempts occurred after the Appli-
cable Period would not have proceeded to arbitration. Meanwhile,
without a clear policy and coherent guidance for arbitrators, arbitrators
routinely adopt an erroneous standard for a "reasonable number of re-
pair attempts". We argue that the case-by-case analysis performed by
DCP during its eligibility review should actually be performed by ar-
bitrators under the law.
B. Why Fewer Repair Attempts Are Permissible under the Lemon
Law
This Section summarizes DCP's eligibility standards for arbi-
tration and explains why those standards should be interpreted more
broadly. Our interpretation of the statute is applicable, mutatis mutan-
dis, to the standards arbitrators use to adjudicate disputes.
A consumer may recover under Connecticut's Lemon Law pro-
gram only if her vehicle has been subject to a "reasonable number of
[repair] attempts."' 9 While the law defines certain presumptions to sat-
isfy the requirement for a "reasonable number of repair attempts," (i)
DCP's approach to eligibility, (ii) the Lemon Law regulations, (iii) the
statutory presumptions, and (iv) the case law each interpret these defi-
nitions in a slightly different way. The result is significant ambiguity
regarding what constitutes a reasonable number of repair attempts.
Consumers would be best served if all parties involved in Lemon Law
arbitrations converged on one consistent and clear definition.
We begin with the law itself. Subsection (d) requires consum-
ers to establish that their vehicle has been subject to a "reasonable
number of [repair] attempts," but it does not define reasonableness ex-
plicitly. Instead, subsections (e) and (f) set out presumptions under
which a consumer is entitled to relief as a matter of law. Thus, under
subsection (e), if a vehicle has been subject to four or more repair at-
tempts and the defect continues to exist (or if the vehicle has been out
17 CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 42-179 (2012).
1 Here, we are addressing the subset of cases where the presumption from
subsection (f) is not at issue.
19 CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 42-179(b) (2012).
Loyola Consumer Law Review
of service by reason of repair for a cumulative total of thirty days), a
consumer is entitled to an irrebuttable presumption that she has made
a reasonable number of repair attempts. 2 0 Subsection (f) provides a
similar presumption of reasonableness if the consumer repairs the car
twice and the defect is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury.21
While subsections (e) and (f) set out presumptions for meeting the
"reasonable number of repair attempts" prong as a matter of law, that
prong does not require four (or two) repair attempts in all cases. Fewer
attempts may be reasonable in certain situations.
Indeed, Connecticut's Lemon Law explicitly contemplates sit-
uations in which a consumer can obtain relief with fewer than four (or
two) repair attempts. The statute provides that "[n]o claim shall be
made ... unless at least one attempt to repair a nonconformity has been
made . . . or unless such manufacturer . . . has refused to attempt to
repair such nonconformity." 22 When the statute was enacted in 1982,
the precursor to subsection (e) did not include this clause. 2 3 The legis-
lature added it in 1989 in response to a performance audit by the Leg-
islative Program Review and Investigations Committee ("Program
Committee"). The Program Committee found that "[i]n some in-
stances, less than four repair attempts is allowed.if the problem is one
for which evidence exists that no repair will bring the vehicle back into
conformance."24 While the Program Committee concerned itself with
cases in which "evidence exists that no repair will bring the vehicle
back into conformance," the text of subsection (e) is broader. By re-
quiring "at least one [repair] attempt," the statute broadly contemplates
additional, unspecified situations in which fewer than four attempts
might be reasonable and thus suffice for recovery.
Not only does Connecticut's Lemon Law simply require "at
least one repair attempt" to prevail on a claim, but notes accompanying
the statute refer to a case in which a consumer repaired his car only
once and successfully recovered. 2 5 In that case-General Motors
Corp. v. Dohmann-the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the con-
sumer's single repair attempt was reasonable because the evidence
2 0Id. § 42-179(e).21 Id. § 42-179(f).
22 Id. § 42-179(b).
23 See General Motors Corp. v. Dohmann, 722 A.2d 1205, 1211 (Conn.
1998).
24 LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM REVIEW & INVESTIGATIONS COMM.,
PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE CONNECTICUT LEMON LAW 20 (1989) [hereinafter
PERFORMANCE AUDIT].
25 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-179 cmt. ("Plaintiffs attempt to replace
tnick's hood constituted a reasonable number of repair attempts.").
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demonstrated that additional repair attempts would not have remedied
the inconsistent paint job on the consumer's truck.2 6 Dohmann also
held that a single repair attempt is reasonable when a manufacturer re-
fuses to remedy a defect. The Dohmann court stated: "[I]t is undisputed
that the defendant met the statutory prerequisite of a single repair at-
tempt for instituting an arbitration proceeding." 27 While some courts
in Ohio and California have interpreted the presumptions as minimum
thresholds for relief,28 Connecticut's statute and case law remain faith-
ful to the plain meaning of the word "presumption." Merriam-Webster
defines a presumption as "a legal inference as to the existence or truth
of a fact not certainly known that is drawn from the known or proved
existence of some other fact." 2 9 Thus, Connecticut presumes that a ve-
hicle has been subject to a reasonable number of repair attempts when
it has been subject to at least four (or two) attempts, notwithstanding
the fact that a reasonable number of repair attempts may be achieved
with fewer than four (or two) attempts.
It is clear that a vehicle that has been subject to four or more
repair attempts within the Applicable Period has satisfied this require-
ment under the presumption of subsection (e). It is equally clear that if
a defect is "likely to cause death or serious bodily injury," only two
repair attempts are needed within a one-year period under subsection
(f). According to the Connecticut Supreme Court, if a manufacturer
refuses to repair a defect or no repair is possible, then just one repair
attempt is sufficient for a claim to proceed to arbitration. 3 0 These are
easy cases. But when consumers repair their vehicle fewer than four
26 Dohmann, 722 A.2d at 1210.
27 Id. n.8 (emphasis added). Other courts have followed suit. For example,
a 2003 district-court case from Nevada cites Dohmann and comments approvingly:
"The Court is in agreement with those decisions which hold that under some circum-
stances a single attempt, or no attempt at all, can be a reasonable number. If, for
example, the manufacturer or dealer refuses to repair or correct, claiming there is no
defect, or after a single repair takes the position that further repair would be unnec-
essary or unavailing, the buyer is not precluded from exercising his or her right under
the lemon law because the manufacturer or dealer refuses to make further (or any)
attempts." Milicevic v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1175-76
(D. Nev. 2003).
28 For example, the Sixth Circuit observed in Temple v. Fleetwood Enter-
prises, Inc. that "[t]he Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted the statute that purports
to establish a presumption of reasonableness to establish instead a definition of rea-
sonableness that a consumer must meet to survive summary judgment." Temple v.
Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 133 Fed. App'x 254, 262 (6th Cir. 2005).
29 Presumption, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (2017),
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/presumption (last visited Apr. 3,
2017).
30 Dohmann, 722 A2d. at 1211 n.9.
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times, or some repairs take place after the Applicable Period, the law
is unclear and demands a case-by-case, all-circumstances-considered
approach. This case-by-case analysis should not take place at the eli-
gibility stage, however, as is current practice. To do so would effec-
tively take legal interpretation out of the hands of arbitrators and, ulti-
mately, the courts.
DCP has promulgated regulations that may contribute to a mis-
perception about the broad standard envisioned by the drafters of Con-
necticut's Lemon Law. Connecticut Regulation 42-181-16 requires au-
tomobile dealers to display a sign at their facilities educating
consumers about their rights under the Lemon Law.31 The sign man-
dated by the regulations should state, in capital letters, "if the same
substantial defect persists with your new motor vehicle after 4 attempts
to resolve it . . . you may be eligible for recourse under Connecticut
law."3 2 This formulation strongly suggests that consumers must repair
their vehicles at least four times to be eligible for Lemon Law relief,
even though subsection (f) requires only two attempts, and our inter-
pretation only requires a single repair attempt during the Applicable
Period for recovery under the generic standard in subsection (d). Other
states have adopted these signage regulations. For example, New
York's signs require dealers to notify consumers that they may be eli-
gible for relief after repairing their vehicle four times within the first
two years or 18,000 miles, notwithstanding that their law also allows
consumers to obtain relief with fewer than four repair attempts. 3 3
The signage regulations are a cause for serious concern for two
reasons. First, they may mislead consumers by incorrectly stating the
law. This is particularly concerning because these signs are likely the
primary way consumers become educated about the Lemon Law. Se-
cond, and probably more important, the signs might confuse dealers
and manufacturers about the law. Since the signs are displayed on
dealer lots, the dealers and their manufacturers are plainly aware of its
content. They may come to believe that the law, in fact, requires four
repair attempts as a necessary condition for recovery. Indeed, manu-
facturers continue to argue, in arbitrations where we have presided,
that the law requires four repair attempts. Perhaps as a result of such
signs, cases that should have settled have proceeded to arbitration be-
cause manufacturers erroneously rely on the "four repair attempt" lan-
guage on the signs.
DCP's eligibility review occupies a middle ground between
these varying definitions. DCP performs a case-by-case analysis. In
31 CoNN AGENCIES REGS. § 42-181-16 (2015).
32 Id. (capitalization removed).
33See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a(m)(2).
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cases with fewer than four repair attempts, a consumer must affirma-
tively allege in her request for arbitration that a reasonable number of
repair attempts has been satisfied. 3 4 Yet a consumer-particularly a
pro se consumer-is not well suited to make complex legal arguments
that are best left to the analysis of an arbitrator. We believe, consistent
with the Connecticut Supreme Court's holding in Dohmann, that DCP
should permit all cases with at least one repair attempt during the Ap-
plicable Period to proceed to arbitration, an approach affirmed in other
jurisdictions like Texas. 3 5 At the same time, DCP should clarify its in-
terpretation of the law regarding what constitutes a "reasonable num-
ber of repair attempts." As it stands, DCP's eligibility review requires
DCP staff to interpret what constitutes a reasonable number of repair
attempts in a vacuum when consumers do not qualify for one of the
statutory presumptions. A better approach would allow arbitrators to
make this determination according to their own competence.
DCP's case-by-case approach to eligibility runs contrary to the
intent and history of the Lemon Law and Connecticut case law. Con-
necticut's Lemon Law was intended to create more permissive stand-
ards than the UCC's "failure of essential purpose" test. That test did
not specify any number of repair attempts. Instead, courts interpreted
the reasonableness or repair attempts on a case-by-case basis. Some
courts developed a variety of factors to assess reasonableness, includ-
ing (i) the good faith of the manufacturer, (ii) the nature of the goods,
(iii) the relationship between the parties, (iv) the facts and circum-
stances behind the negotiation, and (v) the amount of time the vehicle
has been operating correctly.3 It seems contrary to the Lemon Law's
34 In response to our comments, DCP has adjusted their eligibility review to
accommodate our interpretation of the law. Now, consumers with a single repair at-
tempt during the applicable period need not affirmatively allege in their request that
a reasonable number of repair attempts has been satisfied. Such consumers can pro-
ceed directly to arbitration. (This policy, however, is not stated explicitly in DCP's
2016 Arbitrator Handbook.) So far as we are aware, DCP has not changed its inter-
pretation regarding whether repair attempts made after the applicable period can
count towards the presumption that a reasonable number of repair attempts has been
completed.
3s The Texas courts have held that the existence of a statutory presumption
of four repair attempts did not prevent the Department of Transportation from finding
that fewer repair attempts constituted a "reasonable number of repair attempts." Ford
Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep't of Trans., 936 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tex. App. 1996).
36 See Riegel Power Corp. v. Voith Hydro, 888 F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir.
1989); Myrtle Beach Pipeline Corp. v. Emerson Elec. Co. 843 F. Supp. 1027, 1044
(D.S.C. 1993); Connecticut Printers, Inc. v. Baker Perkins PMC, Ltd., Civ. No. H-
86-1507, 1989 WL 107391, at *3 n. 4 (D. Conn. 1989). See generally 67A Am. Jur.
Loyola Consumer Law Review
purpose to enforce a rule more onerous than the standard it was meant
to replace. Taken together, these cases indicate a desire to avoid "ruli-
fying" a standard that applies differently based on circumstances. 37
DCP's current approach takes this important case-by-case decision out
of the hands of arbitrators and does nothing to clarify ambiguous law
for the arbitrators in future hearings, for consumers with defective cars,
or for the manufacturers and dealers who must abide by the law.
In sum, we believe that the role of DCP review should be
largely ministerial. All claims with at least one repair attempt should
proceed. DCP should certainly provide guidance that certain claims are
unlikely to succeed at arbitration, but it should permit all claims with
at least one repair attempt during the Applicable Period to proceed.
III. TIMING OF REPAIR ATTEMPTS
This Part addresses the timing of repair attempts for recovery
under Connecticut's Lemon Law. The statute's key temporal conceit,
as noted above, is the "Applicable Period," defined as "the period of
two years following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle
to a consumer or during the period of the first twenty-four thousand
miles of operation, whichever period ends first." 38 The central question
is as follows: If at least one repair attempt is performed within the Ap-
plicable Period, may repair attempts for the same defect that occur af-
ter the Applicable Period count toward establishing that a "reasonable
number of attempts" have been performed? We argue for an answer in
the affirmative.
With respect to the statute's text, it is instructive to compare
subsections (e) and (f) with subsection (d). Subsections (e) and (f),
which define the presumptions, explicitly introduce time limits for re-
pairs. Subsection (e) uses the phrase "applicable period," while sub-
section (f) imposes a stricter timeframe. Rather than mandating a two-
year period for eligible repairs, it fixes a one-year period within which
two failed repair attempts must have taken place to trigger the pre-
sumption:
[I]t shall be presumed that a reasonable number of
2d Sales § 813 (2017); Howard Foss, When to Apply the Doctrine of Failure of Es-
sential Purpose to an Exclusion of Consequential Damages, 25 DUQ. L. REV. 551
(1979).
37 See e.g., Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Const., Inc., 540 P.2d 978, 987
(Haw. 1975) (advocating for a totality-of-the-circumstances test).
3 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-179(b).
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attempts have been undertaken . . . if the noncon-
formity has been subject to repair at least twice by
the manufacturer or its agents or authorized dealers
within the express warranty term or during the period
ofone year following the date ofthe original delivery
of the motor vehicle to a consumer, whichever period
ends first, but such nonconformity continues to ex-
ist.39
While subsections (e) and (f) specify time limits within which
repair attempts must be made for the two presumptions to kick in, sub-
section (d) makes no mention of the Applicable Period or any temporal
restrictions. It simply sets forth the default "reasonable number of [re-
pair] attempts" standard. Subsection (d)'s silence on timing, when read
alongside the clear temporal rules in subsections (e) and (f), should
cause us to think twice before requiring all repairs to occur during the
Applicable Period. Such a requirement has no direct textual support in
the statute. Further, if this requirement is justified by pointing to the
time limits in subsections (e) and (f), this move would improperly and
needlessly conflate the rules for two special presumptions with the ge-
neric recovery standard in subsection (d).4 0
Unlike Connecticut, some states require all repair attempts to
occur during the Applicable Period in order to qualify for the generic
recovery standard in subsection (d) (as well as the presumptions under
subsections (e) and (f)). For example, the corresponding clause to Con-
necticut's subsection (d) in Virginia's Lemon Law requires a "reason-
able number of repair attempts during the lemon law rights period."4 1
If Connecticut's lemon law statute truly required all relevant repair at-
tempts to occur during the statutory period, as does Virginia's law, it
would have said so. Yet it does not. And subsection (d)'s silence on
temporal matters is instructive for our purposes.
In our view, the only temporal requirement for recovery under
the generic subsection (d) standard is found in subsection (b). As dis-
cussed in Part II, subsection (b) states that, as a threshold matter, at
least one repair attempt must be made in the Applicable Period for
' Although we will not develop this point here, we read subsections (e) and
(f) to say that evidence-that a nonconformity continues to exist can be introduced
from a time after the applicable period. It is only the unsuccessful repair attempts
themselves (whether two or four) that must be completed during the applicable pe-
riod for the presumptions to kick in.
40 See supra Part II.
41 VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-207.13 (West 2011).
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every nonconformity that a consumer alleges.42 The final clause of
subsection (b) offers some limited support for our reading. It requires
manufacturers to make repairs to conform the vehicle to their express
warranties, "notwithstanding the fact that such repairs are made after
the expiration of the applicable period."4 3 We shall call this the Not-
withstanding Clause. At minimum, the Notwithstanding Clause
demonstrates that legislators were concerned with defects that contin-
ued to manifest after the Applicable Period. On the one hand, the Not-
withstanding Clause might simply give consumers additional rights to
repairs under their express warranties, since it does not explicitly refer
to the "reasonable number of [repair] attempts" standard in subsection
(d). On the other hand, this Notwithstanding Clause could mean that
post-applicable-period repairs for the same nonconformity can count
as evidence that a reasonable number of repair attempts has been com-
pleted. The combination of the Notwithstanding Clause and the ab-
sence of temporal limits in subsection (d), which discusses the reason-
able number of repair attempts standard, makes the second reading
more likely than the alternate reading DCP currently employs.
Support for the relevance of the Notwithstanding Clause to
subsection (d)'s standard for recovery also comes from the Lemon
Law's purpose. The Lemon Law is a remedial statute that should be
construed in the consumer's favor. It would be an odd result indeed if
the Lemon Law simultaneously required manufacturers to correct de-
fects even after the Applicable Period-per the Notwithstanding
Clause-while wholly ignoring the manufacturer's failure(s) to correct
those defects for purposes of meeting the "reasonable number of [re-
pair] attempts" standard. This reading, while not foreclosed by the text,
fits poorly within the statute's purpose.
The DCP Arbitration Handbook also interprets the "reasonable
number of repair attempts" prong of the Lemon Law narrowly. The
Handbook was developed in response to the Program Committee's de-
sire for uniformity in arbitral decisions. It represents DCP's authorita-
tive interpretation of the law in the form of guidance. According to the
Handbook, a consumer must make a reasonable number of repair at-
tempts "within the applicable time period."4 4 This timing requirement
misreads the statute and imposes an excessively demanding bench-
mark both for eligibility and recovery. There is reason to doubt that all
repair attempts must be completed within the Applicable Period.
42 See supra Part II.
43 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-179(b).
44 ARBITRATOR HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 7.
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IV. OBJECTIONS
We now consider several objections to our interpretation of the
Connecticut Lemon Law's minimal requirements for recovery.
A. Statutory Purpose
Our account of temporal restrictions on repair attempts in Part
III might seem to cut against the statute's focus on new motor vehicles.
By reading the permissible timeframe for repairs to include post-appli-
cable-period repairs, our interpretation might, in effect, extend the
Lemon Law program to cover defects for older vehicles.
This first worry is tempered by the statute's fundamental re-
quirement that a nonconformity "substantially impair the use, safety,
or value of a motor vehicle." This requirement operates as a check
against the unrestrained use of the Lemon Law to cover older vehicles.
The longer a consumer owns and operates her vehicle, the less likely
it will be that an alleged defect substantially impairs the vehicle's use,
value, or safety. For example, a consumer who seeks relief under the
Lemon Law with 90,000 miles on her vehicle is very unlikely to meet
the "substantial impairment" test, even if she satisfies the "reasonable
repair attempts" prong. The few successful cases where post-applica-
ble-period repairs will count toward the reasonable number of attempts
will be cases in which there is a genuine, substantial manufacturing
defect of the type that the Lemon Law is intended to address. Ford's
PowerShift transmission glitch serves as an excellent example of such
an impairment. Additionally, a consumer who has driven her vehicle
for 90,000 miles will be assessed a steep reasonable-use deduction.
Even if she prevails in the arbitration, she will only be able to obtain a
refund of 25% of the purchase value. Since the statute does not provide
interest, the value of her refund will be further reduced as the number
of years since the purchase increases. Finally, recall that relief is only
available if at least one repair attempt for every alleged nonconform-
ity is performed within the Applicable Period, tethering relief to de-
fects arising in new vehicles.
B. Legislative History
Our interpretation may also appear to be inconsistent with
some legislative materials related to Connecticut's Lemon Law. For
example, in 1989 the Legislative Program Review and Investigations
Committee completed a performance audit and published its recom-
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mendations for changes to the Lemon Law program. 45 This report sum-
marized the repair attempt requirement as follows:
Reasonable number of attempts is: (1) same nonconformity re-
paired four or more times within warranty period and problem contin-
ues; (2) vehicle out of service for repair 30 or more days within war-
ranty period; or (3) vehicle has a nonconformity likely to cause death
or serious injury if driven and two repair attempts have been made dur-
ing first year after original delivery and nonconformity continues. 46
Here, the report appears to accept the requirements for a pre-
sumption as constitutive of what qualifies as a reasonable number of
repairs, and it assumes that DCP will only approve a case for arbitra-
tion when one of these requirements has been met.
This is exactly the interpretation of the Lemon Law that we
criticized in Parts II and III. As we have argued, it is unsupported by
the statutory text in its current form, which makes the above-stated cri-
teria sufficient but not necessary to establish a reasonable number of
repair attempts. While the legislature made a number of statutory
changes based on the Program Committee's recommendations, it left
subsection (d) unaltered. We are ultimately bound by the text of the
statute as enacted, not as described in a Program Committee report that
postdates the statute's enactment.
C. Uptick in Frivolous Claims
A third potential problem is that a more flexible interpretation
of the "repair attempts" standard could lead to an increase in the num-
ber of frivolous claims brought by consumers. Bright-line rules tend to
promote settling disputes before arbitration, while a standard incentiv-
izes consumers and manufacturers to roll the dice on an arbitrator's
judgment. However, our recommendations suggest that DCP should
issue firm guidance on its interpretation of the "reasonable number of
repair attempts" prong of the Lemon Law. We would also urge DCP
to adopt a bright-line "one repair attempt" rule for eligibility. Taken
together, we actually expect the number of arbitrations to drop. Once
manufacturers attain adequate clarity on the authoritative interpreta-
tion of the law, they will be more likely to settle cases before reaching
arbitration. This means, in turn, that consumers can obtain relief with
fewer than four repair attempts without having to expend time and ef-
fort on arbitration.
Second, even under our interpretation of the statute, there are
45 See PERFORMANCE AUDIT, supra note 24.
46 Id. at 5.
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mechanisms to discourage frivolous claims. While DCP should not
treat failure to meet the requirements for a presumption as an absolute
bar to participation in the arbitration program, it can still advise con-
sumers that, if they are clearly ineligible for a presumption, it will be
more difficult to prove their case. In the most egregious frivolous
cases, arbitrators can order consumers to pay some portion of the man-
ufacturer's costs for the arbitration.
V. CONCLUSION
The text, purpose, and case law relating to Connecticut's
Lemon Law support our interpretation of the statute. The text clearly
contemplates the possibility that a consumer can prevail on a Lemon
Law claim with fewer than four (or two) repair attempts. The statute's
broad remedial purpose bolsters this interpretation. Moreover, several
cases, including one from the Connecticut Supreme Court, approve
awards in favor of consumers with fewer than four (or two) repair at-
tempts. The bottom line is that consumers can prevail on a Lemon Law
claim under subsections (b) and (d) without relying on the presump-
tions in subsections (e) and (f).
Based on our interpretation of Connecticut's Lemon Law, we
recommend that DCP introduce the following changes:
1. Amend the Arbitrator Handbook
a. Clarify that fewer than four repair attempts can justify
relief under subsection (d) of the Lemon Law.
b. Explain that repair attempts postdating the Applicable
Period cannot count towards the presumptions in sub-
sections (e) and (f). However, such repairs may count
toward the default requirement of a "reasonable number
of [repair] attempts" in subsection (d), so long as at
least one repair occurs in the Applicable Period.
c. Suggest factors that arbitrators should consider when
determining "reasonable number of repair attempts."
2. Amend the Lemon Law Regulations
a. Require that the sign that dealers must display state that
consumers only need a reasonable number of repair at-
tempts to recover. It should say that, "if the same sub-
stantial defect persists with your new motor vehicle af-
ter 1, 2, or 4 attempt(s) to repair it (depending on the
circumstances*). . . you may be eligible for recourse
under Connecticut Law."
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3. Clarify DCP's Threshold Eligibility Standard
a. Permit all cases to proceed to arbitration with at least
one repair attempt during the Applicable Period. 4 7
4. Amend the Consumer's Request for Arbitration
a. Presently, consumers are not informed that they must
provide a rationale as to why fewer than four repair at-
tempts are reasonable under the circumstances in their
request for arbitration. If DCP wishes to maintain this
requirement, it should amend the application to clarify
that consumers must set out a brief affirmative argu-
ment for their case if they are not entitled to a presump-
tion. We encourage DCP to provide a sample argument
or eliminate this requirement.
Further, repair attempts postdating the Applicable Period can
be introduced as evidence that a reasonable number of repair attempts
has been completed. The text of Connecticut's Lemon Law does not
foreclose this possibility. The statute only requires one repair attempt
during the Applicable Period to be eligible for arbitration. Of course,
for the reasons set forth in Section IV.A, a consumer is unlikely to
prevail in cases in which repairs are attempted long after the Applica-
ble Period. Nevertheless, such claims should not be dismissed at the
eligibility stage, because truly meritorious claims might well be de-
nied. State agencies charged with administering their Lemon Law pro-
grams, like Connecticut's DCP, should review and authoritatively in-
terpret their own statute to give clear guidance to consumers,
manufacturers, and arbitrators on these important matters.
47 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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